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Introduction 
 
Ever since Cain and Abel, crime is a “known known” to human kind. Modern criminal 
codes have dealt quite well with crime within territorial boundaries and even, sometimes, 
outside those boundaries, by applying themselves to crimes committed by nationals abroad. 
Criminal law has then been almost purely domestic, with external threats to the public order 
of States being dealt with by the military. 
Yet, the revolution in information technologies has changed society to a point where 
advances in programming artificial intelligence software and in the processing capacity of 
desktop and/or laptop computers are leading society to a time when a cyberbot will be 
impossible (or at least very difficult) to distinguish from a human person.1 
And the advent of cyberspace has changed the established criminal law model. Online 
crime happens without boundaries, as attacks can come from outside the borders of one State, 
thus scattering crime scenes through two or more countries, sometimes in more than one 
continent.2 
Solutions to the problems posed must be addressed by international law, through the 
adoption of adequate international legal instruments.3 The Convention on Cybercrime, opened 
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1
  Thus, JOHN J. STANTON, “Terror in Cyberspace. Terrorists Will Exploit and Widen the Gap between 
Governing Structures and the Public”, in American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 45 (2000) p. 1022. 
2
  Conveying a similar idea, SUSAN W. BRENNER and JOSEPH J. SCHWERHA IV, “Cybercrime Havens: 
Challenges and Solutions”, Business Law Today, vol. 17 (November/December, 2007), p. 49. 
3
  For a thorough study of the relationship between international conventions and international customary 
law, with special interest in ius cogens rules, see EDUARDO CORREIA BAPTISTA, Ius Cogens em Direito 
Internacional, Lisboa, Lex, 1977, pp. 491 et passim. 
for signature in Budapest, November 23, 2001 and entered into force in 2004,4 aimed to meet 
this challenge – respecting human rights – in the new reality we now call Information Society. 
However, although jurisdiction issues were addressed by the Convention on 
Cybercrime, some weaknesses prevent this Convention from being more effective in making 
international cooperation the solution for cybercrime. As an additional problem, 
cyberterrorism also became a hazard the international community has to deal with. 
Even if it seems to be a real threat,5 cyberterrorism is a scare word that plays with the 
fear of two generally known unknowns – terrorism and technology6 – and discussions rage the 
international fora dealing with terrorism, crime and cybercrime as to the reality of this threat. 
Our initial concern will therefore be the analysis of article 22 of the Convention on 
Cybercrime, first discussing general jurisdiction theories and then the theories applied by the 
Convention, together with other issues dealt with in the article. Then, a discussion of several 
cases dealing with jurisdiction, international cooperation and cybercrime will take us to some 
reflection on cyberterrorism and the applicability of the jurisdiction rules of the Convention 
on Cybercrime in cyberterrorism cases. 
 
I. Article 22. The Analysis 
A. Jurisdiction theories 
 
No less than five different jurisdiction theories have been applied altogether by courts 
and governments, all leading to the ascribing of jurisdiction to one court and adversely 
affecting other courts’ jurisdiction. 
 
1. Territoriality theory 
                                                           
4
  In accordance with article 36, paragraph 3 of the Convention on Cybercrime, after Albania (signed: 
November 23, 2001, ratified: June 20, 2002), Croatia (signed: November 23, 2001, ratified: October 17, 2002), 
Estonia (signed: November 23,/2001, ratified: May 12, 2003), Hungary (signed: November 23,/2001, ratified: 
December 4, 2003), and Lithuania (signed: 23/6/2003, ratified: March 18, 2004), all members of the Council of 
Europe, have expressed their consent to be bound by the Convention. For a list of the States that signed and 
ratified the Convention, see “Convention on Cybercrime. CETS No.: 185”, online at http://conventions.coe.int.  
5
  For an examination of the use of the Internet by terrorists, extremists and activists, see KATHY 
CRILLEY, “Information warfare: new battlefields, Terrorists, propaganda and the Internet?” in Alan O’Day (ed.), 
Cyberterrorism, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004, pp. 67-74. For a discussion of the widespread use 
of information technology by terrorist-type organizations in recent years, for propaganda, fundraising, 
information dissemination and secure communications, see S. M. FURNELL and M. J. WARREN, “Computer 
Hacking and Cyber Terrorism: The Real Threats in the New Millennium?” in Alan O’Day (ed.), Cyberterrorism, 
pp. 113-115.  
6
  See AYN EMBAR-SEDDON, “Cyberterrorism: Are We Under Siege?” in Alan O’Day (ed.), 
Cyberterrorism, p. 11. 
 The theory that jurisdiction is determined by the place where the offence is committed, 
in whole or in part (“territoriality theory”), derives from the Westphalian7 model of 
sovereignty, which is said to include three fundamental principles:  exclusive control over 
the nation’s territory,  non-interference, and  equality between States.8 Although 
discussed and opposed,9 the model seems to have, at least, a general acceptance in what 
concerns theses principles, even if the equality between the States is most of the times only 
formal.10 
Given that the State has sovereignty over the territory, it will obviously have 
jurisdiction over any misconduct which occurs in that territory,11 whether perpetrated or not 
by one of its nationals.12  
A complex case of application of the territoriality theory is Bavaria v. Somm, tried at 
the Amtsgericht of Munich, Germany, in 1999. As Managing Director of CompuServe 
                                                           
7
  On the Westphalia treaties, see CHRISTOPHER HARDING e C. L. LIM, “The Significance of 
Westphalia: An Archaeology of the International Legal Order”, in Christopher Harding and C. L. Lim (eds), 
Renegotiating Westphalia: Essays and Commentary on the European and Conceptual Foundations of Modern 
International Law, The Hague / Boston / London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999, pp. 1-23.  
 For a vision on the centrality of the concept of sovereignty derived from Westphalia and the various 
international relations theories (Marxism excepted), see STEPHEN D. KRASNER, Sovereignty: Organized 
Hypocrisy, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 44-46. 
8
  Thus, JOAN FITZPATRICK, “Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of Law”, Hastings International 
and Comparative Law Review, vol. 25 (2002), pp. 304,310. SEYOM BROWN, International Relations in a 
Changing Global System: Toward a Theory of the World Polity, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1992, p. 
74, however, refers only two principles: one according to which a State is “unequivocally sovereign within its 
territorial jurisdiction”, and the principle of non-interference.  
9
  CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER and WAYNE P. ROTHBAUM, “Libya and the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie: 
What Lessons for International Extradition Law?”, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 14 (Winter, 
1993), pp. 256, 257, refer that “the Westphalian concept of absolute State sovereignty is undergoing challenge 
from the community conception espoused by the U.N. Charter”, and STÉPHANE BEAULAC, The Power of 
Language in the Making of International Law: The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the Myth of 
Westphalia, Leiden / Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, pp. 71 et passim, considers the Westphalian 
system as a myth, given the centralizing relevance of the sovereignty concept in Bodin and the externalization of 
authority that Vattel sees in the concept. 
10
  Thus, FRANCISCO FERREIRA DE ALMEIDA, Direito Internacional Público, 2ª ed., Coimbra, Coimbra 
Editora, 2003, p. 15. 
11
  Thus, FRANCESCO ANTOLISEI, Manuale di Diritto Penale. Parte Generale, 15ª ed., Milano, Dott. A. 
Giuffrè Editore, 2000, p. 118. 
12
  A comparative study of several penal codes in Europe shows that all consecrate the principle of 
territoriality.  Thus, article 6 of the Italian Codice Penal states that “Chiunque commette un reato nel territorio 
dello Stato è punito secondo la legge italiana.” Following the same path, article 113-2 of the French Code Pénal 
states: “La loi pénale française est applicable aux infractions commises sur le territoire de la République”, 
section 3 of the German Strafgesetzbuch states “[d]as deutsche Strafrecht gilt für Taten, die im Inland begangen 
werden” and article 4 of the Portuguese Código Penal states that “[s]alvo tratado ou convenção internacional em 
contrário, a lei penal portuguesa é aplicável a factos praticados em território português, seja qual for a 
nacionalidade do agente.” 
Information Services GmbH, Felix Bruno Somm, a citizen from Switzerland, was charged in 
Germany with being responsible for the access – in Germany – to violent, child, and animal 
pornographic representations stored on the CompuServe’s server placed in the USA.13 The 
court considered it had jurisdiction over Mr. Somm because, even though he was Swiss, he 
lived in Germany.14 
 
2. Nationality theory 
 
The “nationality theory” is also called “active personality theory” because it deals 
primarily with the nationality of the person who committed the offence.15 Being widely 
recognised that a country has almost unlimited control over its nationals,16 said country is 
considered to have the right to exercise jurisdiction over those individuals, wherever they are 
and whatever they do.17 Wherever the offence is committed – at home or abroad – the 
offender probably has better knowledge of the laws of his own State than of the laws of the 
other State. Also, an act can be considered legal in the territory where it was committed, 
whereas it can be considered a crime in the person’s homeland.18 
The case United States v. Galaxy Sports seems to be a good example19 of the 
application of this theory.20 World Sports Exchange, together with its President Jay Cohen, 
                                                           
13
  People v. Somm, Case 8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95 (Amtsgericht, München, Bavaria, 1999). See, also, 
THOMAS STADLER, Der Fall Somm (CompuServe), online in http://www.afs-rechtsanwaelte.de/urteile/artikel06-
somm-compuserve1.php, last visited September 2, 2008. 
14
  Mr. Somm was sentenced to an overall term of imprisonment of 2 years (paragraph II of the sentence), 
even if the following paragraph of the sentence suspended (ausgesetzt) it’s execution on probation. 
15
  Thus, CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, “Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicts of Jurisdiction”, in M. Cherif 
Bassiouni (ed.), Legal Responses to International Terrorism. U.S. Procedural Aspects, Dordrecht, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1988, p. 139. 
16
  Thus, RAY AUGUST, “International Cyber-Jurisdiction: A Comparative Analysis”, American Business 
Law Journal, vol. 39 (Summer, 2002), p. 539. 
17
  This statement is not supposed to be understood in an active, dictatorial sense (where the State controls 
every aspect of the citizens’ life), but in a passive, securitarian sense (where the State has the responsibility to 
protect society against criminal behaviour). 
18
  The European penal codes mentioned above considerer themselves as having jurisdiction with regard to 
certain actions committed abroad by nationals. Thus, article 9 of the Italian Codice Penale, article 113-6 of the 
French Code Pénal, section 5 of the German Strafgesetzbuch and article 5 of the Portuguese Código Penal. 
19
  The sentencing of Robert Matthew Bentley, a citizen of the USA, to 41 months in prison, followed by 
three years supervised release, together with a restitution of $65,000, by the federal grand jury in Pensacola, 
Florida, USA, presided by United States District Judge Richard Smoak, in November 2007, for crimes 
committed in Europe through the Internet, seems to be another good example of application of the nationality 
theory for jurisdiction assumption. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
FLORIDA, “International Computer ‘Hacker’ Sentenced to More Than Three Years in Federal Prison”, online at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/bentleySent.pdf, last visited September 2, 2008. 
was one of the defendants. The company targeted customers in the United States, advertising 
its business all over America by radio, newspaper, and television. Its advertisements invited 
clientele to bet with the company either by toll-free telephone or through the Internet. 21 
Because the company was Antigua-based, the court was unable to assert jurisdiction over it. 
It’s President, however, was a citizen of the USA and could, therefore, be taken to court. Mr. 
Cohen was – on August 10, 2000, after a jury trial presided by Judge Thomas P. Griesa – 
sentenced to a term of twenty-one months’ imprisonment.22 Dealing with the appeal to this 
sentence, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court 
without even discussing the assumption of jurisdiction.23 
 
3. Passive personality theory 
 
While the “nationality theory” deals with the nationality of the offender, assigning 
jurisdiction to his/her homeland courts, its opposite – the “passive personality theory” – is 
concerned with the nationality of the victim. 24 The reasons for ascertaining jurisdiction over 
an offence are similar for both – the almost unlimited control over a country’s nationals – but 
are now seen from the opposite point of view. Thus, when we follow this theory, the courts of 
the State to which the victim belongs assume jurisdiction. 25,26 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
20
  This case was the first U.S. federal action against operators of offshore companies using Web sites to 
facilitate illegal gambling. The complaint names six companies, one of which is Antigua-based World Sports 
Exchange. For a short description of the case, see United States v. Galaxy Sports, Digestible Law. Perkins Coie’s 
Internet Case Digest, online at http://www.digestiblelaw.com/gambling/blogQ.aspx?entry=2305&id=16, last 
visited September 2, 2008. 
21
  For a short description of the company’s activity, see USA v. Cohen, Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
online at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=2nd&navby=docket&no=001574, last visited 
September 2, 2008. 
22
  Of which he seems to have served 17 months. See BENNET KELLEY, “Crystalball.Gov: Predicting 
Cyber Policy in 2008”, Journal of Internet Law, vol. 11 (March, 2008), p. 21. 
23
  See USA v. Cohen, Second Circuit Court of Appeals, online, quoted. For a short description of the 
consequences derived from Mr. Cohen’s conviction, see KATHRYN B. CODD, “Betting On The Wrong Horse: 
The Detrimental Effect of Noncompliance in the Internet Gambling Dispute on the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS)”, William and Mary Law Review, vol. 49 (December, 2007), pp. 946 et passim. 
24
  Thus, CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, “Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicts of Jurisdiction”, p. 139. 
25
  Thus, JOAN FITZPATRICK, “Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of Law”, Hastings International 
and Comparative Law Review, vol. 25 (2002), p. 313, note 37. 
26
  Article 10 of the Italian Codice Penale, article 113-7 of the French Code Pénal, Section 7 of the 
German Strafgesetzbuch and article 5 of the Portuguese Código Penal apply the respective national criminal law 
to acts against the nationals of these countries. 
Good examples of this assumption are the interception of the Egyptian plane that 
carried the Achille Lauro perpetrators by USA planes,27 and the dispute between the USA and 
Italy regarding their judgment,28 together with the several cases presented by the family of 
Mr. Leon Klinghoffer in North American courts against the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, the Lauro company, ABC Tours, Chandris, Inc. (the company that chartered the 
boat) and the Port of Genoa, Italy.29 
In the field of cybercriminology, a fine example of jurisdiction assumption by 
application of the passive personality theory is the sentencing, on July 25, 2003, at the federal 
courthouse in Hartford, Connecticut, USA, by United States District Judge Alvin W. 
Thompson, of the Russian citizen Alexey Ivanov, who lived in Chelyabinsk, Russia, for 
hacking into computers in the United States.30,31 
 
4. Protective theory 
 
The “protective theory” (also called “security principle” and “injured forum theory”) 
is probably the least used – if ever – of the theories that sanction jurisdiction. Dealing with the 
national or international interest injured, this theory permits the assignment of jurisdiction to 
the State that sees its interest – whether national or international – in jeopardy because of an 
offensive action.32 In any case, there seems to be a general trend for penal laws to include this 
                                                           
27
  For a careful description of the facts, see ANTONIO CASSESE, Terrorism, Politics and Law: The Achille 
Lauro Affair, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989, pp. 31-43. 
28
  For all matters dealing with the interception and subsequent reactions, see GREGORY V. GOODING, 
“Fighting Terrorism in the 1980’s: The Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers”, Yale Journal of 
International Law, vol. 12 (1987), pp. 158-161. 
29
  For a description of the civil suits arising out of the Achille Lauro incident, see DEAN C. ALEXANDER, 
“Maritime Terrorism And Legal Responses”, Transportation Law Journal, vol. 82 (1991), pp. 467 et passim. 
30
  U.S.A. v. Ivanov (2003), 172 C.C.C. (3d) 551 (Nfld.C.A.). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, “Russian Man Sentenced for Hacking into Computers in the United States”, online 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ivanovSent.htm, last visited September 2, 2008. 
31
  Another example is the sentencing – in the federal court of Manhattan, Southern District of New York 
– of the Kazakhstan citizen Oleg Zezev to 51 months in prison, for extortion and computer hacking charges, due 
to facts that occurred while he was still living in Almaty, Kazakhstan. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, “Kazakhstan Hacker Sentenced to Four Years Prison for Breaking into Bloomberg 
Systems and Attempting Extortion”, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/zezevSent.htm, last visited 
September 2, 2008. 
32
  Thus, CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, “Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicts of Jurisdiction”, p. 139. 
theory,33 sometimes restricting the application to certain crimes, like counterfeiting of money 
and securities. 
 
5. Universality theory 
 
Finally, the “universality theory” is based on the international character of the offence 
and, contrary to the other theories, allows every State the claim of jurisdiction over offences, 
even if those offences have no direct effect on the asserting State, 34 therefore demanding no 
nexus between the State assuming jurisdiction and the offence itself.  
Two requirements are necessary for assuming jurisdiction:  the State assuming 
jurisdiction must have the defendant in custody,35 and  the crime must be especially 
offensive to the international community.36 Thus, the first crime to be considered for universal 
jurisdiction was piracy, followed by slave traffic.37 
After WW II, war crimes, crimes against humanity, certain terrorist acts, hijacking and 
sabotage of planes, apartheid, torture and other violations of human rights progressively 
became subject to universal jurisdiction.38 
                                                           
33
  See Codice Penale article 7, Code Pénal article 113-10, Strafgesetzbuch section 6, and Código Penal 
article 5, number 1, littera a) (which specifically deals, inter alia, with computer crime). 
34
  Thus, CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, “Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicts of Jurisdiction”, p. 141. 
35
  Questionable means (like abduction) may sometimes have been employed for this. The assumption of 
jurisdiction over what was (wrongly) considered as piracy led to a questionable action of the USA navy fighters 
over the commercial plane taking the Achille Lauro terrorists from Egypt, after the release of the ship. The 
Egyptian plane was diverted to a NATO base in Italy. What having the defendant in custody often requires is 
international cooperation. So, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, “Policy Considerations on Inter-State Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters”, Pace Yearbook of International Law, vol. 4 (1992), pp. 126-128. Thus, v.g. in the case of 
Oleg Zezev, Mr. Zezev was called for a meeting in the U.K. and the British police seized him after he recognized 
the facts of his crime in the presence of a disguised British police officer. 
36
  Thus, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law, Dordrecht, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992, pp. 511-513. Mr. Bassiouni also refers that, in the Middle Ages, some cities 
in Northern Italy would seize and/or persecute certain types of criminals (those they called banditi, vagabundi 
and assassin) when they were under their jurisdiction, even if the crime was committed elsewhere, therefore 
applying the principle of universal jurisdiction for specific crime types. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, Crimes against 
Humanity in International Criminal Law, p. 513. 
37
  Thus, inter alia, KENNETH C. RANDALL, “Universal Jurisdiction under International Law”, Texas Law 
Review, vol. 66 (March, 1988), p. 788. 
38
  Thus, ERIC S. KOBRICK, “The Ex Post Facto Prohibition and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction 
over International Crimes”, Columbia Law Review, vol. 87 (November, 1987), pp. 1523, 1524. This idea is 
shared by THOMAS H. SPONSLER, “The Universality Principle of Jurisdiction and the Threatened Trials of 
American Airmen”, Loyola Law Review, vol. 15 (1969), p. 49, who mentions the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, 
after the end of WW II, as the concept’s expansion moment. 
 JAMES D. FRY, “Terrorism as a Crime against Humanity and Genocide: The Backdoor to Universal 
Jurisdiction”, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, vol. 7 (2002), p. 176, refers that the UN 
 B. Jurisdiction Theories applied by the Convention 
 
An analysis of the several litterae of paragraph 1 of article 22 of the 2001 Budapest 
Convention on Cybercrime (hereafter “the Convention”) shows that the Convention relies 
exclusively on the territoriality and nationality theories to empower parties to establish 
jurisdiction.  
According to litterae a to c, any offence established under articles 2 through 11 of the 
Convention that has occurred in the territory of one Party, in a ship flying its flag or in an 
aircraft registered under its laws, is to be prosecuted in that State.39 A Party is, therefore, 
asked by the Convention to assert territorial jurisdiction if both the person attacking a 
computer system and the attacked system are located within its territory. The same would be 
true when the attacked computer system is within a Party’s territory, even if the attacker is in 
another country. 
Litterae b and c specifically require each Party to establish criminal jurisdiction over 
offences committed on board of ships flying its flag or aircraft registered under its laws. 
Already implemented in the laws of many States,40 this type of jurisdiction assumption is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
General Assembly codified the universality principle, applied in Nuremberg, to war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and aggression crimes.  
 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 codified the universality principle in relation to war crimes. The 1948 
Genocide Convention did not apply universal jurisdiction to genocide because France, the Soviet Union and the 
USA opposed, but many courts applied the principle to genocide, considering this should be considered 
customary international law. Thus, KENNETH C. RANDALL, “Universal Jurisdiction under International Law”, 
p. 789.  
 On the other hand, JONATHAN I. CHARNEY, “Progress In International Criminal Law?”, American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 93 (April, 1999), p. 454, considers that the international illegality of acts such 
as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and similar will be reinforced as a result of the statute of the 
International Criminal Court, showing these acts were seen as international crime before that moment. 
 According to JAMES D. FRY, “Terrorism as a Crime against Humanity and Genocide”, p. 176, the 
principle of universality has been expanded, since de 1940s, to include torture, slave traffic and drug traffic. 
39
  The fact that a Council of Europe-sponsored Convention follows this path is not surprising, given that, 
traditionally, the European Court of Human Rights defends an essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction. Thus, 
inter alia, Öcalan v. Turkey (Application no. 46221/99), Judgment, 12 March 2003, paragraph 93, and the 
decision of inadmissibility of Banković and Others v. 17 countries (Vlastimir and Borka Banković, Živana 
Stojanović, Mirjana Stoimenovski, Dragana Joksimović and Dragan Suković against Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom), Application no. 52207/99, paragraphs 59-61. 
40
  Ships are frequently considered to be an extension of the territory of the State. The same applies, 
mutatis mutandi, to aircrafts.  
 Based on article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the applicability of the territorial 
principle to ships should be transparent. Because this was already expressed in 1927, in The Case of the S.S. 
“Lotus”, where the Permanent Court of International Justice assimilated a ship (the Turkish Boz-Kourt) to the 
territory of its Flag state, it would seem to be a very well established principle. Nevertheless, it wasn't so! In fact, 
just one year after the Lotus decision we find decisions in the opposite direction, held by North American courts, 
most useful where the ship or aircraft is not located in the Party's territory (or territorial 
waters/pace) at the time of the commission of the crime. 
Then, according to littera d, when one national of one State Party commits one of the 
Convention-laid down offences in another State, the State of nationality of the offender also 
has to establish jurisdiction provided, however, the target State criminalises the said offence41 
or the offence was committed outside territorial jurisdiction, of any State, v.g. in the High 
Seas.42 
Paragraph 4 of the Convention further allows Parties to establish jurisdiction in 
conformity with their domestic law, which enlarges the base for jurisdiction should a State 
Party so desire.43 
 
C. Non-application clause 
 
Paragraph 2 of article 22 of the Convention allows Parties to reserve the right to apply 
– or not – the jurisdiction grounds established in litterae b to d. States are thus given a great 
deal of liberty regarding issues related with cybercrime, even if they cannot avoid the 
obligation of prosecution when the offence is committed in their own territory (paragraph 1, 
littera a).  
In practice, and since some offences affect several countries at the same time, this 
non-application clause could result in no country claiming jurisdiction over one given 
offence, thinking that surely other countries will have suffered more damage and will, 
therefore, have priority in prosecuting.44 Therefore, this paragraph should also include an 
obligation for affected Parties to consult with each other, so no offence is left without 
appropriate punishment. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
v.g. in Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir., 1928) and Wong Ock Jee v. Weedin, 24 F.2d 962 (9th Circ. 
1928).  
41
  Which means the target State might not be Party to the Convention. 
42
  In this case, it is our understanding that the target of the offence could also be outside territorial 
jurisdiction. 
43
  As an example of this enlargement of jurisdiction, the Strafgesetzbuch applies itself to certain acts (v.g. 
assaults against air and sea traffic – Angriffe auf den Luft- und Seeverkehr – or trafficking of human beings for 
sexual exploitation – Menschenhandel zum Zweck der sexuellen Ausbeutung) committed abroad regardless of the 
law of the place of their commission (unabhängig vom Recht des Tatorts). See Strafgesetzbuch, Section 6. 
44
  See SUSAN W. BRENNER and BERT-JAAP KOOPS, “Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction”, Journal 
of High Technology Law, vol. 4 (2004), p. 3. The authors mention the fictitious example of a “script kiddie” who 
“concocts a new worm and, without really thinking of the potential consequences, launches it on the Internet”, 
“causing significant damage in numerous countries around the world.” 
Also, to our understanding, this paragraph seems to be in absolute contradiction with 
the wording of paragraph 1, which transmits the idea that the adoption, by Parties, of 
legislative (and other) measures to establish jurisdiction is injunctive. 
 
D. Aut dedere aut judicare 
 
Paragraph 3 of article 24 establishes the international customary law45 principle aut 
dedere aut judicare.46 Should  the alleged offender be found in the territory of one Party 
State (different from the one where the offence was committed),  an extradition be required 
by the offended State, and  the Party in which territory the alleged offender (requested 
Party) is constrained by domestic law not to extradite,47 the requested Party has the duty to 
prosecute, as well as the legal ability to undertake investigations and proceedings 
domestically.48 The underlying idea is the need to ensure that no offence goes unpunished.  
The fact that the obligation to prosecute or extradite allows an extension of 
jurisdiction to the State Party, makes us wonder whether it (the obligation) could be 
considered “universality by Convention” or, in other words, “a limited form of application of 
the universality principle”. However, this is not the adequate context to discuss the 
                                                           
45
  There may be some discussion about this qualification. In spite of that, we believe that the continuous 
inclusion of the principle in various international Conventions establishes the existing feeling that the principle is 
customary law. Agreeing, JORDAN J. PAUST, “Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding 
Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power”, Utah 
Law Review, vol. 2007, issue 2, p. 367, note 51. 
46
  Established by various international Conventions, the principle aut dedere aut judicare began with 
Huig de Groot’s formulation aut dedere aut punire (extradite or punish), and was adapted because not always the 
alleged offenders are actually guilty. Thus, ZDZISLAW GALICKI, “The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (‘aut 
dedere aut judicare’) in International Law”, Report of the International Law Commission. Fiftysixth session (3 
May-4 June and 5 July-6 August 2004). Annex, p. 312, online at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2004/2004report.htm, last visited September 2, 2008. 
47
  Dealing with principles regarding extradition, article 24, paragraph 5, of the Convention establishes the 
applicability of the conditions provided by the domestic law of the requested Party.  
48
  As an example, paragraph 3 of article 33 of the Portuguese Constitution allows for the extradition of 
Portuguese citizens only in conditions of reciprocity established by international convention, in cases of 
terrorism and organized crime, but on the condition the requesting State gives guaranties of a fair and equitable 
process. Also, according to paragraph 6 of the same article, no one is allowed to be extradited from Portugal 
when facing the possibility of death or irreversible harm to his/her physical integrity.  
 Such restrictions would not permit the extradition of a person – of any nationality – from Portugal, let’s 
say, to China to face cybercrime charges, since China has been known to sentence hackers/cybercriminals to 
death (thus MARCUS RANUM, Face-Off: Chinese Cyberattacks: Myth or Menace? online at 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/magazineFeature/0,296894,sid14_gci1321716,00.html, last visited 
September 2, 2008). One such case happened in Canada, with Chinese hacker Fang Yong being extradited to 
China to face the death penalty. See “Chinese Hacker Sentenced to Death for Embezzlement”, People's Daily, 
online at http://english.people.com.cn/english/200006/13/eng20000613_42866.html, last visited September 2, 
2008. 
philosophic idea of whether the extension of jurisdiction provided by international 
conventions can be interpreted this way. 
The Party requesting for an extradition should do so pursuant to the requirements and 
conditions of article 24, paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Convention. The requested Party should 
comply with paragraph 6 of the said article 24. 
 
E. Positive jurisdiction conflicts 
 
Finally, paragraph 5 of the article sub judice deals with positive jurisdiction conflicts. 
This type of conflict may occur because, sometimes, one offence (as described in the 
Convention) could target victims located in only one State;49 whereas other times, it could 
target victims located in several States.50 
This makes it quite normal that several Parties have jurisdiction over one given 
offence. To make proceedings efficient, the Convention establishes the possibility that the 
various Parties that claim jurisdiction over one offence consult with each other in order to 
determine the proper venue for prosecution.51 
This would allow for an economy of means because, in some cases, it will be most 
effective for the States concerned to choose a single venue, whereas in others it may be best 
for one State to prosecute some of the alleged participants, while one or more other States 
prosecute another group of alleged offenders. However, since the obligation to consult is not 
absolute, taking place only “where appropriate”, the effectiveness of this rule seems quite 
compromised. 
                                                           
49
  This would be the case of Oleg Zezev, mentioned above, who – from Almaty, Kazakhstan – targeted a 
company (Bloomberg L.P.) in the USA.  
50
  This would be the case of David L. Smith, who was sentenced to 20 months in an US Federal Prison 
because he was the creator of Melissa, a virulent and widespread computer virus which was found on Friday, 
March 26, 1999. This virus spread all over the globe within just hours of the initial discovery, apparently 
spreading faster than any other virus before and disrupted personal computers and computer networks in 
business and government, in the USA and elsewhere. Melissa was initially distributed in an Internet discussion 
group called alt.sex. The virus was sent in a file bearing the name “list.doc”, which supposedly contained a list 
of passwords for websites with sexual contents. As users downloaded the file and opened it in Microsoft Word, a 
macro inside the document executed and e-mailed the “list.doc” file to the first 50 people listed in the user’s e-
mail address book. See, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, “Florida Man Indicted 
for Causing Damage and Transmitting Threat to Former Employer's Computer System (February 7, 2006)”, 
online at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/anchetaPlea.htm, last visited September 2, 2008. (For more 
information on the Melissa virus, see KATRIN TOCHEVA, MIKKO HYPPONEN and SAMI RAUTIAINEN, “F-
Secure Virus Descriptions: Melissa”, online at http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/melissa.shtml, last visited 
September 2, 2008). 
51
  Thus, SUSAN W. BRENNER and BERT-JAAP KOOPS, “Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction”, p. 41. 
 II. Jurisdiction and Cyberworld threats 
A. Cybercrime and Jurisdiction 
 
The fact that – as mentioned above – article 22 of the Convention establishes 
jurisdiction based on territoriality and nationality grounds seems to actually create more 
problems than it solves. This is so because of the specific type of offence dealt with in the 
Convention: one person can send (upload) files whose contents are criminal from one 
computer in one country to a different computer (the server) in some other country and these 
files can be seen (downloaded) by viewers all over the world. In this case, where is the 
offence committed? In the country where the person lives and/or where the files are uploaded, 
in the country where the server is located or in the several countries where the criminal 
contents is actually seen? And, if we consider this last situation to be the correct 
interpretation, what if the viewer lives in a country where those particular contents are not 
criminal? 
 
1. The Yahoo case 
 
A good example of the complexity of the jurisdiction issues that arise in cyberworld is 
the Yahoo case. Based on the fact that the selling or exhibiting of racist objects, namely Nazi 
memorabilia, is illegal in France, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, in an 
Ordonnance de Référé of May 22, 2000, ordered Yahoo! Inc and its subsidiary Yahoo France 
not only to exclude French surfers from sales of Nazi memorabilia (“cesser... toute mise à 
disposition sur le territoire de la République à partir du site "Yahoo.com"”), but also to 
destroy all the concerned files stored in their server (“détruire toute donnée informatique 
stockée directement ou indirectement sur son serveur”).52 
                                                           
52
  For details, see the text of the sentence: TRIBUNAL DE GRANDE INSTANCE DE PARIS, UEJF et Licra c/ 
Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France, online at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm, last visited 
September 2, 2008. “UEJF” stands for Union des Etudiants Juifs de France; “Licra” stands for Ligue Contre le 
Racisme et l'Antisémitisme. 
In this case, the files53 were probably uploaded from an unknown source and were 
stored in a server in the United States. Then, one French court asserted jurisdiction over them 
because they could be seen in France and its contents was criminalized in France. 
But the case does not end here. Dissatisfied with the sentence of the French court, 
Yahoo decided to file a declaratory judgment action in U.S. District Court in San Francisco, 
hoping to obtain a ruling that the French court’s order could not be enforced against Yahoo in 
the United States. In its lawsuit, besides discussing computer technical matters regarding the 
(im)possibility of excluding some users of their site from some of the Web pages (those 
containing Nazi memorabilia), Yahoo maintained that allowing enforcement of the foreign 
court’s order in the United States would violate the First Amendment. U.S. District Judge 
Jeremy Fogel of the Northern District of California ascertained jurisdiction over LICRA and 
UEJF (the French anti-racism associations), agreed with Yahoo regarding the violation of the 
First Amendment and entered a declaratory judgment in the company’s favour.54 
It was LICRA and UEJF’s turn to be dissatisfied, this time with Judge Fogel’s ruling, 
which led them to appeal to the 9th Circuit. Eventually, the matter came up for decision before 
an 11-judge panel of that court and the majority of the judges concluded that the district court 
had jurisdiction over the defendants (LICRA and UEJF), but the judgment of the district court 
was reversed.55 
Could the Convention56 help solve complex problems like the one presented in this 
case? It probably could! But would it? 
                                                           
53
  The files to which the French court wanted no access from French citizens were digital copies of 
Adolph Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” and of the book “Les protocoles des Sages de Sion”, the supposed proceedings 
of a Zionist Congress supposedly held in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897. This book was thought – according to the 
research of Russian historian Vladimir Burtsev – to have been written by agents of the Okhrana, the secret police 
of Tsar Nicholas II, who himself seemed to have anti-Semitic ideas (thus, JEAN-MARIE ALLAFORT, “Les 
Protocoles des Sages de Sion”, online at http://www.nuitdorient.com/n138.htm, last visited September 2, 2008). 
Further research from Russian historian Mikhail Lépekhine, done after the opening of Soviet archives to 
researchers, in 1992, showed that it was, in fact, the Russian forger Mathieu Golovinski who wrote the text while 
living in Paris. Thus, ÉRIC CONAN, “L’origine des Protocoles des sages de Sion”, L’Express, 16/11/1999, online 
at http://www.phdn.org/antisem/protocoles/origines.html, last visited September 2, 2008.  
54
  Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, N.D.Cal. 2001, Nov. 7, 2001, online at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/is02/readings/yahoo-order.html, last visited September 2, 2008. 
55
  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, Yahoo! Inc., a Delaware corporation, 
v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, a French association; L’Union des Etudiants Juifs de France, 
a French association, No. 01-17424, D.C. No. CV-00-21275-JF, online at 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0117424p.pdf, last visited September 2, 2008. 
56
  According to the Council of Europe website, the United States of America signed the Convention 
together with the majority of the Council of Europe members, on November 23, 2001, ratified the Convention on 
September 29, 2006, and it entered into force in the USA on January 1, 2007. (See online, 
http://conventions.coe.int.) 
 2. Controlling Law and International Cooperation 
 
Immediately after establishing the jurisdiction principles mentioned above, the 
Convention proceeds to elaborate on international cooperation. Article 23, titled “General 
principles relating to international cooperation”, creates an obligation for Parties to cooperate 
with each other in matters related with extradition (article 24), mutual assistance (article 25), 
spontaneous information (article 26) and some other details. 
Good examples of international cooperation are the Rome Labs case and the Tore 
Tvedt case.  
According to Appendix B of the Staff Statement of the US Senate’s Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, of June 5, 1996,57 on March 28, 1994, computer systems 
administrators at Rome Air Development Center, Griffiss Air Force Base, New York, 
discovered that their network had been penetrated and compromised by an illegal wiretap 
computer program called a “Sniffer”, which was covertly installed on computer networks by 
hackers to illegally collect user logons of authorized users. This program had been covertly 
installed on one of the systems connected to laboratory's network. 
The intruders were found to be a pair of hackers calling themselves “Datastream 
Cowboy” and “Kuji,” whose identities were unknown. “Datastream Cowboy”, a 16-year old 
who enjoyed hacking into military networks, was located by an informant, who was able to 
provide a telephone number and address in the United Kingdom. US Air Force agents 
established a working relationship with New Scotland Yard agents and they arrested the 
hacker.58 At the date of the report, “Datastream Cowboy” was pending prosecution in the UK. 
Three years later, Richard Pryce, a.k.a. “Datastream Cowboy”, was fined with £1,200 for the 
intrusion.59 Matthew Bevan, a.k.a. “Kuji”, was also arrested, waited 18 months for a trial and 
was acquitted because it was judged not to be in the public interest to pursue the case.60 
                                                           
57
  STAFF STATEMENT. U.S. SENATE. PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, Security in 
Cyberspace, June 5, 1996, Appendix B, online at http://fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960605b.htm, last visited 
September 2, 2008. 
58
  STAFF STATEMENT. U.S. SENATE. PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, Security in 
Cyberspace, online, quoted, p. 6. See, also, GEORGE MOHAY, ALISON ANDERSON, BYRON COLLIE, OLIVIER 
DE VEL and RODNEY D. MCKEMMISH, Computer and Intrusion Forensics, Norwood, MA, Artech House, Inc, 
2003, pp. 308, 309, who use this as a case study for security in cyberspace. 
59
  See the newspaper news published the day after the sentence was given in DAVID GRAVES, 
“'Datastream Cowboy', 19, fined £1,200 for hacking secret US computer systems”, Telegraph, March 22, 1997, 
The Tore Tvedt case dealt with the posting of racist and anti-Semitic propaganda on 
the Internet. Tore Tvedt, whose Web page was stored in a North American server, was the 
founder of the Norwegian far-right group Vigrid (an organization which professes a doctrine 
that mixes neo-Nazism, racial hatred and religion, claiming to worship Odin and other ancient 
Norse gods), and was considered responsible for the contents of the Web page – even if it was 
stored out of Norway’s jurisdiction – and was sentenced by a Norwegian court to seventy-five 
days in jail with forty-five days suspended, plus two years of probation.61 
In the Rome Labs case, the controlling law was that of the location where the actions 
in question occurred, the hacker’s location. In the Tvedt case, however, the controlling law 
was that of the country in which the damage was said to have occurred. But both depended on 
international cooperation to be solved. 
However, not all cases deal with good international cooperation. On October 10, 2001, 
the U.S. Department of Justice announced that Vasiliy Gorshkov, of Chelyabinsk, Russia, had 
been found guilty on 20 counts of conspiracy, various computer crimes and fraud, which 
made him face a maximum sentence of five years in prison for each count.62 
After having discovered that some companies had suffered intrusions from hackers, 
the FBI created a shell company, called it Invita,63 and eventually established contact with the 
hackers and lured them to the U.S. with employment opportunities. After long talks and some 
online testing, Vasiliy Gorshkov and Alexey Ivanov agreed to a face-to-face meeting in 
Seattle, where they were asked – by FBI undercover agents – about their hacking skills and 
assumed responsibility for various hacking incidents and activities. At the conclusion of the 
Invita meeting, the two men were arrested.64 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1997/03/22/nhack22.html, last visited 
September 2, 2008.  
60
  For a short story on Matthew Bevan, see MARK WARD, “History repeats for former hacker”, BBC 
News, online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4761985.stm, last visited September 2, 2008. 
61
  See the media report with comments at “Norwegian Jailed for Web Racism”, CNN, Apr. 23, 2002, 
online at http://www.con.com/2002/WORLD/europe/04/23/norway.web/index.html, last visited September 2, 
2008. 
62
  Thus, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, “Russian Computer Hacker 
Convicted by Jury”, online at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/gorshkovconvict.htm, last visited 
September 2, 2008. 
63
  Describing the company, “High-tech net helped FBI snag alleged hackers”, USA Today, 02/06/2002, 
online at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-05-09-fbi-tech-sting.htm, last visited September 2, 2008, 
stated: “Invita Security looked like a typical Internet company: it had offices, computers, employees, even a 
secure computer system. The only thing missing was the customers.” 
64
  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, “Russian Computer Hacker Convicted 
by Jury”, online, quoted. 
According to court filings,65 the Department of Justice made several unsuccessful 
attempts to get Russian authorities to cooperate and seize the contents of the hackers’ servers 
in Russia. The North American agents then accessed two servers in Russia where Gorshkov 
kept his data and downloaded over 1 Gigabyte of information. Subsequently, they obtained a 
search warrant to look at the downloaded files and got strong evidence of the men’s computer 
hacking and fraud activities.66 
This was one case where international cooperation did not function due to a lack of 
response from one of the sides. However, another case was reported where there was a will to 
cooperate but the law itself did not allow it.  
Tens of millions of computers were affected in May, 2000, when the “Love Bug” 
virus swept the Internet. The virus was quickly traced back to the Philippines,67 but then law 
enforcement officials ran into a problem, as the Philippines had no law against hacking.68 
Therefore, despite all the damage done,69 nobody was ever prosecuted for the “Love Bug” 
virus. The United States wanted the extradition of the main suspect, 70 and there is an 
international extradition agreement between the United States and the Philippines. However, 
the lack of law against hacking in the Philippines made extradition impossible in this case.71 
In the Invita case, the controlling law was that of the country in which the damage was 
said to have occurred. In the “Love Bug” case, however, the controlling law was that of the 
location where the actions in question occurred, the hacker’s location. None of the cases 
depended on international cooperation to be solved. In fact, one was solved by hacking into 
                                                           
65
  Reported by ROBERT LEMOS, “FBI "hack" raises global security concerns”, CNET News, May 1, 
2001, online at http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-256811.html, last visited September 2, 2008. 
66
  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, “Russian Computer Hacker Convicted 
by Jury”, online, quoted. 
67
  Supposedly to a Filipino computer student who wrote a thesis on stealing passwords from the Internet. 
“Love Bug revenge theory”, BBC News, May 10, 2000, online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/743082.stm, last visited September 2, 2008. 
68
  See “Philippine investigators detain man in search for ‘Love Bug’ creator”, CNN, May 8, 2000, online 
at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/05/08/ilove.you.02/index.html, last visited September 2, 2008. 
69
  In the UK alone, British Telecom, Vodafone, Barclays, Scottish Power and Ford UK were among the 
giant firms affected, together with universities and many companies of variable size. “'Love Bug' bites UK”, 
BBC News, May 4, 2000, online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/736080.stm, last visited September 2, 
2008. 
70
  See, inter alia, “Suspected hacker may face extradition requests”, CNN, May 9, 2000, online at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/2000/LAW/05/09/internat.hacking.law/index.html, last visited September 2, 2008. 
71
  Thus, SETH MYDANS, “Philippine Prosecutors Release 'Love Bug' Suspect”, The New York Times, May 
10, 2000, online at http://partners.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/05/biztech/articles/10virus.html, last visited 
September 2. 2008. 
the servers in another country, whereas the other was not solved at all due to an absence of 
legislation. Sometimes there is a will, but there is no way! 
 
3. Jurisdiction Issues 
 
Cybercrime is so broad and can be so complex that becomes very difficult to 
investigate. And jurisdiction adds to the complexity of investigating a technological matter. 72 
This difficulty becomes more evident when dealing with international jurisdiction. 
Doctrine considers jurisdiction as defining three levels of authority:  the authority to 
prescribe (the capacity to establish and prescribe criminal and regulatory sanctions, normally 
prerogative of a government),  the authority to judge (the competence to hear disputes, 
normally prerogative of courts), and  the authority to enforce (the capacity to compel 
compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws, regulations, orders, and judgments, as 
well as the capacity to investigate suspect behaviours, both normally also prerogative of a 
government).73 
The Convention on Cybercrime points the way toward cooperation with respect to 
criminalizing certain behaviours and pursuing those responsible. It does not, however, resolve 
the issues of international jurisdiction. The investigation of an international crime will always 
have to depend on the good will of the third country, or else there is no investigation. 
However, even if the Convention relies heavily on international cooperation, sometimes – as 
we have seen – this is not enough to take the investigation to an end. We are, therefore, forced 
to conclude that the Convention is short on giving States the necessary weapons to fight this 
type of crime. 
As an attempt to remedy this deficiency, we would propose three amendments to the 
Convention:  that the consultations of which we have spoken above were not to take place 
                                                           
72
  Regarding the complexity of investigation, see DAN KOENIG, “Investigation of Cybercrime and 
Technology-related Crime”, National Executive Institute Associates, online at 
http://www.neiassociates.org/cybercrime.htm, last visited September 2, 2008. Peter Stephenson, Investigating 
Computer-Related Crime: A Handbook for Corporate Investigators, Boca Raton, FL, CRC Press, 1999, p. 13, 
adds that most organizations are not equipped to investigate computer crime. 
73
  Thus, inter alia, SUSAN W. BRENNER and BERT-JAAP KOOPS, “Approaches to Cybercrime 
Jurisdiction”, p. 4. According to IAN BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed., Oxford, 
University Press, 2002 (1998), p. 58, law-making capabilities are one of the factors that determine the 
coexistence between nations. 
“where appropriate”, but that they would be established as an obligation;74  that the 
Convention itself be effectively considered as an extradition convention between the Parties;75 
and  that the Convention be amended (or supplemented by additional protocol) to include 
an internal mechanism that allows police investigators from one Party to perform their work 
online in another Party, subject only to an informal communication to the authorities in the 
other Party. 76 
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  Should the Convention create an obligation to consult – instead of merely allowing for this 
consultation, as it does with the current wording – this obligation would have the advantage of permitting the 
determination of the most appropriate venue for persecution, together with an economy of means that would help 
the international community in not leaving any crime unpunished. 
75
  We are aware that paragraph 3 of article 24, allows a Party to consider the Convention as legal basis for 
extradition. However, the wording of the Convention is weak. The party “may consider” the Convention as legal 
basis for extradition, but is allowed to consider the opposite. A stronger wording would, in our view, be 
recommendable. 
76
  The formal request to the other Party’s authorities can be useful when dealing with apprehending 
people or computers. Nevertheless, in cybercrime, sometimes the investigator has to follow the path of the 
perpetrator of the offence and may find himself messing with a computer that is physically in a place where he 
does not have jurisdiction. A formal request would probably result in losing the evidence. However, an informal 
communication would allow the investigator to pursue the investigation in time. 
 In the Invita case, for example, if the North American agents had not entered the Russian servers 
without permission, there would have been no way to prove that the statements both hackers made at the Seattle 
interview were true, because it was expected that, as soon as the two suspects’ counterparts in Russia found out 
about the arrests, they would have destroyed the data.  
 The data copied from the Russian computers had large databases of credit card information (more than 
56,000 credit cards) that were stolen from Internet Service Providers. The two Russian computers also had stolen 
bank account and other personal financial information of customers of online banking at a couple of North 
American banks. Should the research have waited for a formal answer ... there would have been no proof and the 
information would still be usable by others. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 
“Russian Computer Hacker Convicted by Jury”, online, quoted. 
B. Cyberterrorism and Jurisdiction 
1. To Be or Not To Be 
 
Cyberterrorism conjures up images of fierce terrorists unleashing catastrophic attacks 
against computer networks, creating chaos, and paralyzing entire nations. A frightening 
scenario indeed, but how likely is it to occur? From people in denial to people in distress, 
opinions come in all flavours. 
On the denial corner, strong statements make the day. “There is no such thing as 
cyberterrorism – no instance of anyone ever having been killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) 
using a computer” says an editor of one monthly magazine from Washington, DC, USA.77 
Besides arguing that no cyberattack has ever been attempted by terrorists,78 the main line of 
reasoning of those in this field is that terrorist organizations usually follow the least resistance 
path and, therefore, are bound to prefer a cheaper and easier alternative to cyberattacks: 
physical attacks.79 Yet, are physical attacks now easier and cheaper? 
On the opposite corner, statements come in no weaker form. Carnegie Mellon 
University computer scientist Roy Maxion is reported to have written, in 2001, to President 
George W. Bush warning him about the fact that the United States was at grave risk of a 
cyberattack that could devastate the public mind and the nation’s economy more broadly than 
the September 11 attacks.80 And the reasoning for this extreme position is based on the 
findings that al Qaeda operators spent time learning about how to disrupt critical 
infrastructures through the Internet and had plans to put that knowledge to use.81 Yet, are 
things really this bad? 
If it is true that they are out there, what is then the measure of danger that 
cyberterrorists really embody? 82 The reality may have been grasped in July 2002, as the 
                                                           
77
  JOSHUA GREEN, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism”, Washington Monthly, November 2002, online at 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html, last visited September 2, 2008. 
78
  Ibidem. 
79
  Referred by SEAN P. GORMAN, Networks, Security and Complexity: The role of Public Policy in 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, Glos, UK, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2005, p. 11. 
80
  See DAN FITZPATRICK, “Cybersecurity expert warns of post-9/11 vulnerability”, Global Security, 
September 9, 2003, online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030909-cyber01.htm, last visited 
September 2, 2008. 
81
  See BARTON GELLMAN, “Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared”, Washington Post, June 27, 2002, page 
A01, online at http://www.crime-research.org/library/Barton.htm, last visited September 2, 2008. 
82
  FRED COHEN, “Cyber-Risks and Critical Infrastructures” in Alan O’Day (ed.), Cyberterrorism, pp. 1-
8, lists several critical infrastructures and mentions nightmare scenarios for each one. He then proceeds to solve 
United States Naval War College, working in conjunction with Gartner Research, conducted 
what they called a “digital Pearl Harbour” simulation. According to the conclusions of this 
simulation, “a group of hackers couldn’t single-handedly bring down the United States’ 
national data infrastructure, but a terrorist team would be able to do significant localized 
damage to U.S. systems.”83 
The analysts concluded that it would be possible to inflict some serious harm to the 
US data and physical infrastructure systems, but it would require a syndicate with significant 
resources, including $200 million, country-level intelligence and five years of preparation 
time. 84 
The conclusions then show that a cyberattack on the United States is possible, but 
would require huge planning and a great amount of financing. Considering the above 
mentioned Rome Labs case, if one 16-year old British boy – with £ 750 worth of equipment85 
– was able to intrude a network connected to the US military, the funding requirement is 
probably overstated.  
Cyberterrorists might not be menacing to kill people directly, as a traditional terrorist 
attack normally does, but one cyberattack could make life very, very difficult, maybe even 
destroying or severely damaging the complete economical and social system of one country. 
We thus conclude that cyberterrorism is definitely a real threat which, unfortunately, is here to 
stay. And, since the chain of terrorist events after September 11, 2001 shows terrorists to have 
diversified their targets, we should therefore not overlook the possibility of a cyberattack 
targeting some other less prepared country than the USA. 
If an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, we should learn at least one lesson 
from the catastrophic terrorism actions perpetrated in New York, Madrid and London: 
terrorists did not attack from a distance. If a cyberattack is to take place in our countries, it 
can be masterminded elsewhere, but will probably be executed from within our own 
networks. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
every one of those scenarios within a framework ranging from only a few hours to a few days, thus showing that 
a cyberattack would not create havoc for long. As he mentions the Internet, for instance, he states that there are 
hundreds of thousands of trained experts that could recreate a functional Internet “in a matter of days” (p. 8). He 
recognizes, by that, the possibility of one such attack. 
83
  MARGARET KANE, “U.S. vulnerable to data sneak attack”, CNET News, August 13, 2002 11, online at 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-949605.html, last visited September 2, 2008. 
84
  Ibidem.  
85
  Thus, DAVID GRAVES, “'Datastream Cowboy', 19, fined £1,200 for hacking secret US computer 
systems”, online, quoted. 
 2. Hackers, Crackers, Terrorists and Jurisdiction Issues 
 
Hackers tend to be more of a nuisance than a danger. Most of the time, they try 
unauthorized access to networks for the fun of it, for the challenge, or to put networks to a 
test. 86 Crackers, however, are criminal hackers that also try unauthorized access to networks, 
but have malicious intents.87 Cyberterrorists are people that use cyberterror to achieve 
political or social change. 88 
Because their motivation and goal is so much different from those of crackers and 
terrorists, hackers are not likely to either become terrorists or be directly employed by them. 
For trust reasons, it is not likely that terrorists would hire crackers. But it is not impossible for 
terrorists to gain hacking skills.89 
Whatever motivation or goal leads one person (or a group) to hack into a network 
system, be it hacking, cracking or terrorism, the same jurisdiction problems are present to the 
investigator and to the judge. Obtaining proof of the action, detaining the suspects and 
presenting them to a court can only to be achieved with quick reaction and the appropriate 
international tools. This author believes that international cooperation is the way to achieve 
this goal; however, he also finds that existing international tools fall short on making 
international cooperation injunctive. 
 
                                                           
86
  ANDREW MICHAEL COLARIK, Cyber Terrorism. Political and Economic Implications, Hershey / 
London / Melbourne / Singapore, Idea Group Publishing, 2006, pp. 37-39, discusses the actions normally 
attributed to hackers, stating (p. 37) that some have even published their findings, either in academic or 
nonacademic venues. 
87
  Idem, pp. 40-42. 
88
  Idem, p. 46, states that because no legislatively defined meaning of cyberterrorism exists, “the domain 
is open to debate, dispute, and ultimately, ambiguity.” In this text we are not trying to establish a definitive 
definition for cyberterrorism, for which reason we employed vague wording, as did DOROTHY E. DENNING, 
“Cyberterrorism”, Testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism Committee on Armed Services, 
U.S. House of Representatives, May 23, 2000, online at 
http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/cyberterror.html, last visited September 2, 2008, when she 
wrote: “Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It is generally understood to mean 
unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done 
to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives.” 
89
  Thus, AYN EMBAR-SEDDON, “Cyberterrorism: Are We Under Siege?” p. 15. A. M. COLARIK, Cyber 
Terrorism, p. 51, states “Cyberterrorists exist today. The Osama bin Laden Crew is a group of self-proclaimed 
cyberjihadists”, and proceeds to mention force multiplier tasks that cyberterrorists are supposed to be 
accomplishing. 
C. The applicability of Article 22 to cyberterrorism cases 
 
As a threat, cyberterrorism would probably not justify a convention to deal with it. 
The explicit inclusion of cyberterrorism in the Convention on Cybercrime by means of an 
additional protocol would probably suffice. Whatever the choice, it is, however, this author’s 
belief that to fight cyberterrorism there is no need for a definition. The broad acceptance of 
the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation shows there is no need to use “scare words” in order to reach consensus. 
In fact, it was probably due to the lack of such words that the Rome Convention was so 
successfully adopted. Thus, given the fear of terrorism in our society, an Additional Protocol 
to the Convention – either detailing some offences that would be considered cyberterrorism or 
specifying when the offences established in the Convention should be considered more than 
just cybercrimes – should be enough.90 
The effectiveness of this Protocol, as well as of the Convention itself, would however 
depend on the number of States that ratify them. The fact that the United States of America 
has ratified the Convention, in accordance with its article 36, paragraph 1, in fine, is a sign 
that major non-Council of Europe Member States will be willing to cooperate with Member 
States in the fight against cybercrime and, obviously, against cyberterrorism. Yet, although 
the Convention entered into force in July 1, 2004, key Member States of the COE – v.g. 
Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, Spain, Austria, as well as the author’s own country, 
Portugal – have not (as of September 1, 2008) ratified the Convention, a situation that can 
spawn great concern. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Jurisdiction, or the lack of it, seems to be the most problematic issue in the fight 
against cybercrime and cyberterrorism. The fact that cyberattacks can come from anywhere in 
the world makes investigation, producing evidence and taking the offenders to court an 
immense task that can only be achieved through international cooperation. 
                                                           
90
  This Protocol could also include the amendments referred above (Part II, section A, subsection 3) 
regarding consultation between the Parties, extradition rules and the inclusion of a mechanism to allow police 
investigators to perform their search online, subject only to an informal communication to the local authorities. 
The Convention on Cybercrime was designed to help accomplish the goal of reducing 
and/or tearing down the difficulties of the fight against cybercrime. Still, it shows itself to be 
insufficient because international collaboration in not injunctive and there are no rules to 
unload the burden of formality from the work of police specialists in charge of investigating 
international cybercrime/cyberterrorism cases. 
Furthermore, the fact that key Member States of the Council of Europe are taking their 
time to ratify the Convention also leaves a bitter notion of lack of interest in cybercrime, one 
type of crime that is becoming increasingly important for companies all over the world. Let’s 
hope our countries don’t wake up too late. It is easy to be wise after the event! 
As a final note, we would like to say that, given the path towards catastrophism and 
indiscriminate attack on human lives taken by modern day terrorism, we would consider 
possible and positive the inclusion of terrorism in the list of international crimes against 
humanity – in accordance with littera k of number 1 of article 7 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) – which would entitle States to have universal jurisdiction 
to apprehend terrorist agents, although jurisdiction to prosecute would be given to the 
International Criminal Court. 
Thus, since, in the case of international conventions, the authority to prescribe still 
rests with the government of the State Party – because no State is forced into being a Party to 
a Convention and all States still have the right to sign (or not) and ratify (or not) any given 
Convention – the governments of the Member States concerned would only forfeit the 
authority to judge to the International Criminal Court. All States would keep the authority to 
prescribe, both domestically and by means of ratification of conventions, and the authority to 
enforce, should the International Criminal Court convict the agents. 
 
 
